article de périodique

Looting and conflict between ethnoregional groups : Lessons for state formation in Africa Voir tous les contenus avec cette valeur

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Vol.46, n°1

Azam, Jean-Paul

23

2002

131-153

Guerre civile Voir tous les contenus avec cette valeur

ang

0022-0027

A game-theoretic model is analyzed for discussing the determination of looting and fighting activity during a civil war between two ethnoregional groups. The Nash equilibrium of this game emphasizes population size, production capacity and productivity, and access to external funding as the main determinants of the size of the armies and the intensity of looting activity. The Nash equilibrium of the game between the two warlords involves an excessive level of looting. Some lessons are drawn from this framework to bring out the minimum redistribution of resources between groups that must take place in a peaceful equilibrium.